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Currently, there are over 16,000 criminal offenders in Pennsylvania who are serving the balance of their sentences outside of prison
walls under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole.' Approximately 1,700 return to prison annually for violation of their paroles. 2 This Article will focus on the nature and
extent of the right, under both federal and Pennsylvania law, that
parolees have to the assistance of legal counsel to aid them in resisting the revocation of their paroles.
I. Parole Revocation Hearings Compared With Criminal Trials
Prior to discussing a parolee's right to counsel, it is necessary to
understand the procedural framework in which a parolee, under the
supervision of the Parole Board,' is charged with violating parole.

Further, one must understand how the Parole Board determines
whether parole should be revoked. To gain such an understanding it

is necessary to distinguish parole revocation hearings from criminal
trials.
Parole, by its very nature, is a variation of the punishment

phase of the criminal justice system.' While on parole, the parolee
remains in the legal custody of the Commonwealth and is still considered to be serving his or her sentence, albeit outside the prison
walls.' Parole is, therefore, an alternate method by which a conI. 1985 PA. BD. PROBATION & PAROLE ANN. REP. 39. The Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole hereinafter will be referred to as the Parole Board.
2. Id. at 36.
3. Only those prisoners with a maximum sentence of two years or longer come under
the jurisdiction of the Parole Board. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
Prisoners with maximum sentences of less than two years may be supervised by the Parole
Board when so directed by the trial judge. Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 § 331.26 (Purdon 1964). Although such prisoners are supervised by the Parole Board, the trial court retains
jurisdiction over the prisoner and has the power to revoke parole after a violation is proven.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 314 (Purdon 1964); cf. Commowneatlh v. Donato, Pa.
Super. -,
508 A.2d 1256 (1986) (trial court retains authority over probationer to institute
revocation proceedings although probationer is supervised by the Parole Board pursuant to PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.25 (Purdon 1964)).
4. Commonwealth v. Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 526, 469 A.2d 1371, 1377 (1983).
5. Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Parole, 409 Pa. 204, 185 A.2d 581
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victed offender may serve out a judicially imposed sentence that contemplates his or her eventual return to society.' As a condition of

being permitted to serve a portion of his or her sentence outside
prison, the parolee is required to abide by certain conditions that
govern his or her behavior while under the supervision of the Parole
7
Board.
Under both federal and Pennsylvania law, there is no right to a

grant of parole once a prisoner becomes eligible. Rather, a grant of
parole is a discretionary act of grace and mercy on the part of the

Commonwealth. 8 A prisoner has a right only to apply for parole once
he or she becomes eligible and to have that application fairly considered by the Parole Board. 9 The Parole Board is not required to consider prisoners for parole sua sponte when the prisoner has not made
an application for but otherwise is eligible for a grant of parole. 10
While the Parole Board conducts interviews with prisoners applying

for parole, a prisoner has no right to the assistance of counsel in
applying for parole, nor does a prisoner have a right to an adversarial hearing on his or her application."
However, once parole has been granted by the Parole Board and

the prisoner actually leaves confinement, the prisoner is vested with a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the limited freedom that
parole offers.12 Because of this liberty interest, the Parole Board can-

not revoke a prisoner's parole and return him or her to prison without first affording the prisoner a hearing that meets the minimal due
process standards of advance notice and an opportunity to be
heard.13 A parole revocation hearing, however, is not the equivalent
(1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963); Commonwealth-ex rel. Sparks v. Russell, 403 Pa.
320, 169 A.2d 884 (1961); 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 63.2 (Shepard's 1985).
6. Hendrickson, 409 Pa. at 204, 185 A.2d at 581. For an excellent, although dated,
discussion of the public policy considerations behind parole, see Note, A Survey of the Law of
Probation and Parole in Pennsylvania, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 309 (1957).
7. Barlip v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 45 Pa. Commw. 458, 405 A.2d
1338 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 §§ 331.21a(b), 331.23 (Purdon 1964); 37 PA. ADMIN.
CODE § 63.4 (Shepard's 1986).
8. Commonwealth v. Brittingham, 471 Pa. 241, 275 A.2d 83 (1971); Blair v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 78 Pa. Commw. 71, 467 A.2d 71 (1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 977 (1984).
9. Krantz v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 38, 483 A.2d
1044 (1984); Banks v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 4 Pa. Commw. 197, (1971).
10. Weyand v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commw. 32, 503
A.2d 80 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.22 (Purdon 1964).
II. Counts v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 277, 487
A.2d 450 (1985).
12. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
13. Id. at 489.
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of a criminal trial; rather, it is a civil administrative hearing.1 4 Accordingly, a prisoner accused of violating the terms and conditions of
parole is not afforded the same panoply of rights as a defendant in a
criminal prosecution. 5 For example, neither the Rules of Criminal
Procedure1 6 nor the Sentencing Code 7 apply to parole revocation
hearings.18 Instead, the prisoner has only a limited right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and this right
may be denied altogether if good cause is specifically found by the
Parole Board.1 9
Prisoners also have a right to the assistance of legal counsel in
resisting the revocation of their paroles.2 0 This right includes the assistance of a lawyer at both the hearing and appellate levels.2 1 The
remainder of this Article will examine the nature of a prisoners'
right to counsel in parole revocation matters under both federal and
Pennsylvania law.
II. The Right to Counsel Under Federal Law
The leading federal case concerning the right to counsel in parole matters is Gagnon v. Scarpelli.22 In this case, Gerald Scarpelli
pleaded guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin for which the trial
court sentenced him to a term of fifteen years in prison. The trial
court suspended the sentence, placing Scarpelli on seven years probation. If Scarpelli failed to abide by the conditions of probation, he
was to be committed to prison to serve out the fifteen year sentence.
Wisconsin permitted Scarpelli to transfer his probation to Illi14. Id. at 489-90; Gundy v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa. Commw.
618, 478 A.2d 139 (1984).
15. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
16. Hill v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa. Commw. 140, 492 A.2d
80 (1985).
17. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9701-9781 (Purdon 1982).
18. Trenge v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 71 Pa. Commw. 523, 456
A.2d 224 (1983).
19. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; Sinwell v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole,
46 Pa. Commw. 429, 406 A.2d 597 (1979); Kemp v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 43 Pa. Commw. 390, 402 A.2d 708 (1979).
20. Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
21. Bronson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); Brewer v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and
Parole, 90 Pa. Commw. 75, 494 A.2d 36 (1985).
22. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). While this case dealt with court-supervised probation rather
than state parole, the Court noted that "revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole." Id. at 782.
For due process purposes, the Court held that revocation procedures for both are identical. Id.
Contra Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentence on conviction would be imposed only
if probation were revoked).
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nois under the interstate compact.2 3 The Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois, accepted him for supervision on August 5, 1965. Subsequently, on August 6, 1965, Scarpelli and an
accomplice were arrested during the commission of a burglary. After
being advised of his rights, Scarpelli confessed to the burglary.2 4 As
a result, Wisconsin revoked his probation without a hearing on the
basis of a report submitted by Illinois authorities. Wisconsin charged
that Scarpelli had violated his probation by associating with a known
criminal and participating in the Illinois burglary. He was then incarcerated to begin serving the fifteen year sentence previously imposed by the trial court.
In December of 1968, Scarpelli commenced a habeas corpus action in federal district court contending that the actions of Wisconsin
authorities in revoking his probation without a hearing or counsel
violated due process. The district court agreed that the lack of a
hearing and representation by counsel was a violation of due process
and granted the writ. 25 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.26
The Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the
lack of a hearing violated Scarpelli's due process rights. However,
the Court specifically disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's holding
that due process always requires the state to provide an indigent
prisoner with appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing.
The Court found no absolute right to appointed counsel at a parole
or probation revocation hearing in either the sixth 27 or the fourteenth
amendment. 28 Rejecting the per se rule set forth by the Seventh Circuit, the Court held that the question of whether a prisoner has a
constitutional right to appointed counsel should be decided on a
case-by-case basis.
23. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 57.13 (West Supp. 1985). The Pennsylvania counterpart to the
Wisconsin statute on interstate compacts is found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 321 (Purdon
1964). The compact is an agreement between the states whereby the receiving state agrees to
supervise a prisoner paroled by the sending state. One of the features of the interstate compact
is its special procedure for returning parole violators from the receiving state to the sending
state rather than using the normal extradition procedure. See Commonwealth v. Kaminsky,
206 Pa. Super. 480, 214 A.2d 251 (1965).
24. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 780. After Wisconsin revoked Scarpelli's probation and committed him to prison on the previously imposed sentence, Illinois authorities apparently
dropped the burglary charges. In his habeas corpus action, Scarpelli alleged that his 1965
confession was coerced and he would have been able to prove his innocence had he gone to
trial. See Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72, 73 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
25. See Scarpelli, 317 F. Supp. at 72.
26. See Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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The Court also held that the constitutional right to appointed
counsel, if any, was grounded in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and not in the sixth amendment.2 9 The Court's
holding in this regard underscored its prior holding in Morrissey v.
Brewer.3 ° In that case the Court held that parole revocation proceedings were not part of a criminal trial, nor were they the equivalent of
a criminal prosecution. 1
In Gagnon, the Court also provided guidelines for the states to
follow in determining whether a prisoner facing revocation of parole
has a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Under those guidelines, appointed counsel should be provided when the prisoner makes
a request based upon a timely and colorable claim that:
1. the prisoner has not committed the alleged violations of
the conditions of parole or probation; or
2. if the violation is a matter of public record or uncontested, there are substantial reasons that justified or mitigated
the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that such
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or
present.32
The Court also stated that the responsible agency, here the Parole
Board, should also consider whether the prisoner, in doubtful cases,
appears capable of speaking effectively for himself or herself. When
a request for appointed counsel is refused, the Court continued, the
record should clearly state the grounds for such refusal.3 3
III.

The Right to Counsel Under Pennsylvania Law

Gagnon v. Scarpelli remains the primary authority dealing with
the right of prisoners to assistance of counsel at parole revocation
hearings under the fourteenth amendment. Under Pennsylvania law,
however, prisoners apparently enjoy a greater right to counsel than
that afforded under the federal constitution. In fact, the right of a
prisoner to appointed counsel in parole revocation proceedings in
Pennsylvania precedes by several years the limited right set forth by
the Supreme Court in Gagnon.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

411 U.S. at 790-91.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Id. at 489.
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
Id. at 79-91.
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A.

Basis in Case Law

The seminal Pennsylvania case holding that prisoners facing
revocation of their paroles have a right to assistance of counsel to aid
them in resisting parole revocation is the 1969 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Tinson.34 In that case,
Arthur Tinson pleaded guilty to a charge of voluntary manslaughter
on an indictment charging murder in 1959 in Chester County common pleas court. A sentence of five to twelve years was imposed.
Upon the completion of the minimum term of that sentence, Tinson
was paroled. In 1966, the Parole Board returned him to prison as a
"technical" parole violator3" following a parole revocation hearing.
He had not been represented by counsel at that hearing.
In 1968, Tinson filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA)3- in which he alleged that his guilty plea was invalid and that his 1966 parole recommitment was also invalid due to
lack of counsel at the revocation hearing. After rejecting the challenge to the original guilty plea, the court held that Tinson was entitled to counsel under the federal constitution at his parole revocation
hearing. The court, in a decision written by Justice Samuel J. Roberts determined that counsel is required at a parole revocation hearing to ensure that the revocation hearing itself is constitutionally
valid.
Justice Roberts based this determination on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Mempa v. Rhay 3 7 In Mempa, the Court
held that a probation violation hearing, in which probation could be
revoked and a sentence entered, was a stage of a criminal proceeding
at which substantial rights of the accused may be affected. Thus, the
Court in Mempa concluded that representation by counsel was constitutionally required.38 In Tinson, the Commonwealth argued that
Mempa was inapplicable to Tinson's case in that Mempa involved
sentencing while Tinson had already received a sentence in 1959,
34. 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
35. A "technical" parole violator is one who violates the terms and conditions of parole
other than by the commission of a new crime of which he or she is convicted or found guilty.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a(b) (Purdon 1964). A "convicted" parole violator is one
who, "during the period of parole ... commits any crime punishable by imprisonment, for
which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo
contendere.
...
Id. § 331.21a(a).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 - 1180-12 (Purdon Supp. 1982) (repealed).
These provisions are now found at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9551 (Purdon 1982).
37. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
38. Id. at 134-35.
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which sentence the Parole Board could not alter.39 The supreme
court rejected this argument and held that counsel was required at a
parole revocation hearing.40 Only Chief Justice John C. Bell, Jr. dissented from the court's decision giving prisoners a federal constitu41
tional right to assistance of counsel at parole revocation hearings.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded Tinson in 1973 when it decided Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v.
Rundle.42 In its Rambeau decision, authored by Justice (later Chief
Justice) Henry X. O'Brien, the Pennsylvania Supreme court again
held that a parole revocation proceeding is a "critical stage" in a
criminal prosecution. Citing Mempa v. Rhay, the court emphasized
the importance of the presence of counsel at such a proceeding. Justice O'Brien noted that "[T]o say that this proceeding, the very last
contact appellant had with the court before his cell door slammed
shut, perhaps for life, is not a critical stage of the litigation, substan43
tially affecting [appellant's] rights, is to completely ignore reality.
The court concluded by extending to convicted parole violators the
same constitutional right to counsel that it extended to technical parole violators in Tinson.4 4
In his concurring opinion in Rambeau, Justice Pomeroy noted
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v.
Brewer,45 cast a grave doubt upon the validity of resting a right to
counsel at parole revocation hearings on the authority of Mempa.46
Justice Pomeroy also criticized the court's basing a prisoner's right
to counsel upon the sixth amendment, again noting Chief Justice
Burger's pronouncement in Morrissey that "[plarole arises after the
end of the criminal prosecution, including the imposition of sentence. '47 Justice Pomeroy would, therefore, base a prisoner's constitutional right to counsel on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment rather than the sixth amendment, which deals exclusively with criminal prosecutions.4 8
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Rambeau, Justice
Eagan noted that the court's Tinson decision "apparently gives the
39. Tinson, 433 Pa. at 322-34, 249 A.2d at 551-52.
40. Id. at 332-33, 249 A.2d at 551-52; see supra note 22.
41. Tinson, 433 Pa. at 334, 249 A.2d at 552.
42. 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973).
43. Id. at 18, 314 A.2d at 847 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 428 Pa. 210, 21516, 236 A.2d 805, 809 (1968) (PCHA case)).
44. Id.; see supra note 35.
45. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
46. Rambeau, 455 Pa. at 22-24, 314 A.2d at 849.
47. Id. at 23, 314 A.2d at 849 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 24 n.4, 314 A.2d at 850 n.4.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

parolee more than is constitutionally required." 4 9 Noting that the
Morrissey decision specifically held that a parole revocation hearing
need not be held before a board including judicial officers or lawyers,
Justice Eagan concluded that the Morrissey court implied that legal
assistance was not constitutionally required." This conclusion of Justice Eagan, along with that of Justice Pomeroy, was borne out later
that year when the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli5 l in which the Court held that there
is no absolute right to counsel at parole hearings under the federal
constitution.
Since Rambeau and Tinson, a parolee's right to assistance of
counsel at a parole violation hearing has been considered absolute
under Pennsylvania law. In Bronson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,5 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended that
right to include the appellate process as well as the actual violation
hearings. While acknowledging both the Morrissey and Gagnon decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not elaborate on how
those decisions affected its prior holdings in Tinson and Rambeau,
which the court continued to cite as authority for the parolee's absolute right to counsel.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court was the next tribunal
to analyze the legal basis for a parolee's absolute right to counsel
under Pennsylvania law in the 1984 decision of Coades v. Pennsylvania Board of Probationand Parole.58 In this case, David Coades was
on parole from a two to four year sentence when he was arrested and
charged with the robbery of a supermarket. He was convicted of that
robbery on June 3, 1976. On August 4, 1977, Coades appeared
before a quorum of the Parole Board for a parole violation hearing
stemming from his conviction of the new criminal charges. Coades
refused to execute a written waiver of counsel prior to the hearing,
as requested by the Parole Board. Before the Board, Coades stated
that, while he wanted a public defender, he had experienced some
trouble in obtaining one and desired to proceed with the hearing
without an attorney so as not to delay the matter any further. He
then executed a written waiver of counsel form provided by the Parole Board. The Parole Board subsequently revoked his parole and
ordered him to return to prison. Coades then attacked his parole vio49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 27, 314 A.2d at 852.
Id. at 26, 314 A.2d at 851.
411 U.S. 778 (1973); see supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
84 Pa. Commw. 484, 480 A.2d 1298 (1984).
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lation hearing contending that his waiver of counsel was neither voluntary nor informed, and that it was therefore ineffective and violative of his due process rights.
The Commonwealth Court, in an opinion authored by Judge
Robert W. Williams, Jr., analyzed the foundations in Pennsylvania
law underlying a parolee's absolute right to assistance of counsel.
The court determined that, while the right is absolute, it is statutory
in nature and not mandated by either the federal or the Pennsylvania Constitution.54 The Commonwealth Court thus recognized that
the constitutional foundation of both Tinson and Rambeau had been
eroded by the United States Supreme Court decision in Morrissey
and Gagnon. The court also examined Article I, Section 9, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968, which grants an accused the
right to counsel, and the court held it inapplicable to parole violation
proceedings. That provision, by its very language, is applicable only
to criminal prosecutions. It does not extend to civil administrative
55
hearings such as the Parole Board's parole violation proceedings.
Finally, the Commonwealth Court determined that there was no independent state constitutional right to counsel at parole violation
56
proceedings before the Parole Board.
B.

Basis in Statutory Law

The absolute right a parolee enjoys to assistance of counsel
before the Parole Board must, therefore, be found under statutory
law. The Coades court found two statutes so significant that the
right to counsel could be predicated upon them. The first, section
502 of the Administrative Agency Law, 57 permits all parties appearing before a Commonwealth administrative agency the right to representation by counsel. In Bronson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the Parole Board was a Commonwealth agency for purposes of the Administrative Agency Law. 56 The second statute upon
which the Coades court based the right to counsel was section
54. Id. at 496-97, 480 A.2d at 1305.
55. Id. at 495, 480 A.2d at 1304 (citing with approval Gundy v. Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation and Parole, 82 Pa. Commw. 618, 478 A.2d 139 (1984) (Parole Board violation
hearings considered civil administrative hearing to which principles of administrative law
apply)).
56. Id. at 496, 480 A.2d at 1304-05.
57. 2 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 502 (Purdon Supp. 1985). This section reads as follows:
§ 502. Representation
Any party may be represented before a Commonwealth agency.
58. 491 Pa. at 556, 421 A.2d at 1024.
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6(a)(10) of the Public Defender Act of 1968, 59 which requires public
defenders to represent indigents in probation and parole proceedings
and appeals therefrom. Section 502 of the Administrative Agency
Law provides the general right to representation before the Parole
Board, while section 6(a)(10) of the Public Defender Act provides
the basis for the right to free counsel if indigent. Therefore, while
counsel may not be required at parole violation proceedings as a
matter of federal or Pennsylvania constitutional law, the availability
of counsel is required under statutory law.
The General Assembly strengthened this statutory right to
counsel in 1981 when it amended the Public Defender Act by adding
Section 10.1 .o That section was enacted by the General Assembly in
response to the Commonwealth Court's decision in Passaro v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,"' in which the Commonwealth Court held that the county in which a parolee is physically
incarcerated is responsible for providing legal representation to indigent parolees under section 6(a)(10) of the Public Defender Act.
Section 10.1 was designed to shift the financial burden of that representation from the nine counties that host state correctional facilities
to the counties in which sentence was originally imposed.
The Passaro holding was extended by the Commonwealth
Court in Brewer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probationand Parole62 to
situations in which a parolee initiates an appeal of a Parole Board
revocation order while in one state correctional institution and is
subsequently transferred by the Department of Corrections to another facility. In such cases, the Commonwealth Court held that the
responsibility of providing representation is transferred from the initial confining county to the subsequent confining county. However,
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.6(a)(10) (Purdon Supp. 1985). This section reads as
follows:
§ 9960.6. Duties
(a) The public defender shall be responsible for furnishing legal counsel, in
the following type of cases, to any person who, for lack of sufficient funds, is
unable to obtain legal counsel:
(10) Production and parole proceedings and revocation thereof;
60. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.1Oa (Purdon Supp. 1985). This section reads as
follows:
§ 9960.10a. Expenses for parole proceedings
The county which imposed the sentence from which the defendant was paroled shall be responsible for reimbursing the public defender's office of any
other county for reasonable expenses incurred for representing that defendant in
a parole revocation proceeding and appeals therefrom.
61. 56 Pa. Commw. 32, 424 A.2d 561 (1981) (en banc).
62. 90 Pa. Commw. 75, 494 A.2d 36 (1985).
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the county that originally imposed the sentence from which the defendant was paroled remains liable for reimbursement of the costs of
that representation under section 10.1 of the Public Defender Act.
C. Comparison with Other Administrative Proceedings
Parole Board revocation hearings are recognized as civil administrative hearings. However, parolees who are brought before the Parole Board and charged with violating the terms and conditions of
their paroles are afforded a significantly greater right to the assistance of counsel than are claimants before other Commonwealth administrative bodies. While Section 502 of the Administrative Agency
Law provides that any party may be represented by counsel before a
Commonwealth agency, no court has interpreted that provision as
entitling parties to free counsel if indigent.63 Additionally, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has further distinguished Parole
Board revocation cases from other administrative proceedings by declining to extend to litigants in those other administrative proceedings the right to effective assistance of counsel."4
The major difference between proceedings before the Parole
Board and those before the Commonwealth agencies is that the Parole Board deals with a liberty interest of the parolees while the
other Commonwealth agencies deal with property interests. Another
difference is that parole is an integral part of Pennsylvania's criminal
justice system, although it is clearly not part of a criminal prosecution. 5 It is because of this liberty interest and the connection with
the criminal justice system that the General Assembly has specially
provided free legal assistance to indigent parolees, but not to indigent unemployment or workmen's compensation claimants. It has
provided such assistance by obligating the public defender's office to
represent indigent parolees in resisting the revocation of their pa63. Of course indigents may avail themselves of free legal services through the Legal
Aid programs run by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. However, legal aid
attorneys are strictly limited in the type of cases and clients they may accept. For example,
federal law prohibits Legal Aid attorneys from accepting any case which is "fee-generating."
See 42 U.S.C. § 1397; see also Peace v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 93 Pa. Commw. 300,
501 A.2d 1164 (1985). In addition, many county bar associations support legal aid offices or
engage in mandatory pro bono programs to provide legal services to indigents. However, it
must be noted that these services are as strongly based upon statute as is the public defender
program that is available to indigent parolees.
64. See, e.g., Vereen v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Pa.
Commw. -,
515 A.2d 637 (1986); Rosenthal v. State Board of Pharmacy, 73 Pa. Commw.
132, 457 A.2d 243 (1983); Johnson v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bernard S.
Pincus Co.), 14 Pa. Commw. 220, 321 A.2d 728 (1974).
65. Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 501 A.2d
1110 (1985); Commonwealth v. Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371 (1983).
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roles. For the same reasons the Pennsylvania appellate courts have
more closely scrutinized the Parole Board's honoring of that right to
counsel as well as enforcing the obligation of the various public defender's offices to represent indigent parolees upon proper request.
This protection of the right to counsel is not found in cases dealing
with other Commonwealth agencies.
D. Protecting the Right to Counsel
1. Determining From Where Counsel is Obtained.-There existed
considerable confusion among the various county public defender's
offices as to which office was responsible for providing indigent parolee's with attorneys following the Tinson, Rambeau and Bronson
decisions. The confusion arose from the fact that parolees were usually incarcerated and given their parole hearings outside of the
county that imposed the original sentence. The overwhelming majority of these parolees was housed in one of the nine state correctional
facilities66 throughout the Commonwealth. The public defender's offices for the counties that hosted state correctional facilities contended it was the obligation of the public defender's office of the
sentencing county to provide legal counsel under Section 6(a)(10) of
the Public Defender Act. The public defender's offices for the counties in which the parolees were originally sentenced argued that it
was the responsibility of-the host counties to provide legal counsel to
such parolees because the parolees were physically located within
those counties. The end result of this dispute was that a great many
parolees who were charged with parole violations and incarcerated in
state correctional facilities were denied legal representation. The dispute was finally resolved by the Commonwealth Court in 1981 when
it decided Passaro v. Pennsylvania Board of Probationand Parole.6"
The factual background of Passaroillustrates the problems that
parolees faced in their efforts to secure the services of a public defender at their hearings before the Parole Board. Mario Passaro was
originally convicted of burglary in Fulton County common pleas
court, and sentenced to a term of one and one-half to five years.
66. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections currently operates nine state correctional institutions (SCIs) and regional correctional facilities (RCFs) located in the following
counties: Allegheny (SCI-Pittsburgh); Centre (SCI-Rockview); Cumberland (SCI-Camp Hill);
Huntingdon (SCI-Huntingdon); Luzerne (SCI-Dallas); Lycoming (SCI-Muncy); Mercer
(RCF-Mercer); Montgomery (SCI-Graterford); and Westmoreland (RCF-Greensburg). A
tenth state correctional institution, located in Philadelphia (SCI-Philadelphia), was closed by
the Commonwealth in 1970 and sold to the City of Philadelphia for one dollar in 1971.
67. 56 Pa. Commw. 32, 424 A.2d 561 (1981) (en banc); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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After being paroled in September, 1976, he was again arrested in
November 1979, in Centre County on attempted homicide charges.
Passaro pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in Centre County common pleas court in May 1979, and received a sentence of one and
one-half to six years. Subsequently, Passaro was transferred to the
State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI-Camp Hill). While
at SCI-Camp Hill, he was given a parole revocation hearing, but he
refused to participate without counsel. The Parole Board ordered
him recommitted as a convicted parole violator in absentia. Passaro
then requested a full Board parole revocation hearing. 68
Prior to the full Board hearing, Passaro was informed by the
public defenders of both Centre County, the county of his latest conviction, and Cumberland County, the county wherein he was incarcerated, that they would not represent him before the Parole Board.
At the hearing, which was held on July 31, 1979, Passaro was not
represented by an attorney. As a result of the hearing, the Parole
Board revoked Passaro's parole and recommitted him as a convicted
parole violator.
The Commonwealth Court, in an opinion written by President
Judge James C. Crumlish, Jr., vacated the Parole Board's recommitment order and remanded the case for a new hearing at which Passaro was to be represented by the Cumberland County public defender's office. In determining that the public defender of the county
where the parolee was currently incarcerated, rather than the committing or sentencing county, should provide Passaro with an attorney, President Judge Crumlish wrote:
It is patently absurd, for whatever reason, to require defense
counsel to travel the length and breadth of this Commonwealth,
to necessitate the transportation of parolees and the attendant
security problems, and to incure wholly unnecessary expenses in
time and money when those same interests can be served by the
incarceration site's public defender.6 9
Since Passaro, parolees have been regularly represented by public
defenders in revocation proceedings before the Parole Board. As
68. A full Board hearing is one presided over by three of the five members of the
Parole Board. A parolee's right to appear in person before members of the Parole Board was
determined in 1973 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth ex rel
Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973).
69. 56 Pa. Commw. at 42, 424 A.2d at 565. When the public defender of the confining
county is unable to represent a particular parolee before the Parole Board due to a conflict of
interest, the public defender of an adjoining county is notified of the situation and is required
to accept the responsibility to provide an attorney to an indigent parolee upon proper request.
See Dobson v. Jacobs, 46 Pa. Commw. 548, 406 A.2d 1207 (1979).
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noted by Judge Glenn Mencer in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Passaro, the overwhelming burden of providing attorneys to
indigent parolees has fallen upon those nine counties that host state
correctional facilities.7" Of those nine counties, the burden is greatest
in Allegheny, Cumberland and Montgomery, whose state correctional institutions are also regional Diagnostic and Classification
Centers for the Department of Corrections. 7
The General Assembly has acted to correct the financial burden
that the Passaro decision placed on those nine counties. In 1981, it
amended the Public Defender Act by adding section 10.171 in which
the General Assembly mandated that the sentencing county must reimburse the confining county for the costs of representing indigent
parolees before the Parole Board. This amendment was made retroactive to January 1, 1981.
2. Obtaining Counsel for Parole Board Hearings.-The Passaro court clearly held that the Parole Board is not obligated, nor
does it possess the power or authority, to provide counsel for indigent
parolees.7" Parole Board regulations, however, impose upon it the obligation to inform the parolees of their right to counsel and to offer
some limited assistance in retaining the services of counsel. For example, in addition to informing the parolee of the right to the assistance of counsel and that the parolee will in no way be penalized for
seeking counsel, the Parole Board is required by its own regulations
to provide the parolee with the name and address of the local public
defender.7 4 While the regulations and court decisions do not so specifically require it, the Parole Board also maintains the practice of
sending copies of revocation hearing notices to the appropriate public
defender's office to put the public defender on notice that his or her
services might be sought by indigent parolees.
70. Passaro, 56 Pa. Commw. at 43-44, 424 A.2d at 566 (Mencer, J., concurring and
dissenting).
71. The Department of Corrections maintains four diagnostic and classification centers
that the Department utilizes as reception points for new or recommitted inmates. The Eastern
Diagnostic and Classification Center is located at SCI-Graterford, in Momtgomery County;
the Central Diagnostic and Classification Center is located at SCI-Camp Hill, in Cumberland
County, and the Western Diagnostic and Classification Center is located at SCI-Pittsburgh, in
Allegheny County. A fourth Diagnostic and Classification Center, exclusively for female prisoners, is located at SCI-Muncy, in Lycoming County. See 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 91.4 (Shepard's 1985).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.1Oa (Purdon Supp. 1985); see supra note 60.
73. Passaro, 56 Pa. Commw. at 39-40, 424 A.2d at 564; see also Patterson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 215 Pa. Super. 532, 533, 258 A.2d 693, 694 (1969).
74. See 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 71.2(l)(iv), 71.2(12)(v), 71.4(3)(ii), 71.4(5)(v) (Shepard's 1983).
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In addition to providing information to the parolees and gratuitous notice of the scheduled revocation hearings to the applicable
public defender, the Parole Board, pursuant to its regulations, grants
the parolee reasonable continuances for the purpose of obtaining the
services of counsel. 7 5 Those regulations also provide that the period
of time attributable to those continuances does not count against the
Parole Board for purposes of holding a timely revocation hearing.78
Prior to 1982, it had been the Parole Board's unofficial policy to
grant a parolee two continuances of a revocation hearing for the purpose of obtaining the services of counsel. If the parolee had not obtained counsel by the third scheduled hearing, the Parole Board
would proceed with the revocation hearing without the parolee being
represented by counsel. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court invalidated that policy in Brown v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole7 7 holding that, since representation by counsel at parole
revocation hearings is of such critical importance, the Parole Board
proceeds at its peril when it conducts a hearing at which the parolee
is unrepresented and requests counsel. 8
Following the Commonwealth Court's decision in Brown, the
Parole Board's practice went to the other extreme. The Board
granted every request for a continuance to obtain the services of an
attorney. However, the Commonwealth Court's 1985 decision in
O'Hara v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole9 returned
some common sense to this procedure.
In O'Hara,the parolee, Thomas O'Hara, murdered a friend in
the lobby of a hotel in Erie on November 8, 1979, while on parole
from an assault conviction. Appointed counsel represented O'Hara at
his criminal trials in Erie County and at his parole revocation hearing held in Erie County. However, O'Hara's appointed counsel did
not appear to represent him after he was transferred to SCI-Pittsburgh, in Allegheny County. The Parole Board scheduled revocation
hearings at SCI-Pittsburgh on five different occasions between June
75. See id.
76. See 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 71.5(i) (Shepard's 1985). The Parole Board has one
hundred twenty days in which to provide an alleged parole violator with a parole revocation
hearing. See id. §§ 71.2( 1) and 71.4(2). When the Parole Board fails to provide an alleged
parole violator with a timely revocation hearing, the parolee is entitled to a dismissal with
prejudice of the alleged parole violations. Capers v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole,
42 Pa. Commw. 356, 400 A.2d 922 (1979). These sections of the Parole Board's regulations
are essentially the Board's equivalent to the one hundred eighty day rule in the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100.
77. 70 Pa. Commw. 597, 453 A.2d 1068 (1982).
78. Id. at 600, 453 A.2d at 1070.
79. 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985).
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1980, and February 1982. The June 1980, hearing was continued at
the request of O'Hara's court-appointed Erie County defense counsel. O'Hara had no further contact with this attorney after that point
and consequently, O'Hara was not represented at any of the four
subsequently scheduled hearings. In February, 1982, the Parole
Board refused to grant O'Hara any further continuances to procure
the presence of his Erie County counsel and, after O'Hara refused to
participate further, held the hearing in absentia. O'Hara appealed
the resulting revocation order, arguing that the Parole Board's actions had deprived him of his right to counsel.
In holding that the Parole Board had respected O'Hara's right
to counsel, the Commonwealth Court modified its prior holding in
Brown. The court held that the decision as to whether a parolee
should be granted a continuance to procure the presence of counsel
should be made only after weighing the competing interests involved.
In the beginning, these interests weigh heavily in favor of the parolee's exercise of his or her right to counsel. However, as the court
noted, there comes a point in time when other competing interests
outweigh the parolee's interest in obtaining further time with which
to procure the services of counsel. In O'Hara's case, after four continuances to procure counsel's presence spanning a period of eighteen
months, the court ruled that the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant O'Hara any further continuances. Thus,
while the Parole Board is required to grant parolees reasonable continuances, the O'Hara court specifically held that parolees are not
entitled to unlimited continuances in order to procure counsel. 80
Despite the obligation placed upon the Parole Board by its own
regulations and by appellate court decisions, in the final analysis, the
ultimate burden of procuring counsel rests squarely upon the shoulders of the parolee. The Passaro court held that it was the duty of
the public defender of the county of incarceration, upon proper request, to provide indigent parolees with legal representation in resisting the revocation of their paroles by the Parole Board. 81 The
Public Defender Act itself does not obligate the public defender to
seek out indigents for the purpose of providing them with legal representation in those areas covered by the Act. In order to avail himself or herself of state-provided defense counsel, the parolee must (I)
request counsel from the applicable public defender and (2) provide
satisfactory information to show the public defender that he or she is
80.
81.

Id. at 365, 487 A.2d at 95.
Passaro, 56 Pa. Commw. at 41, 424 A.2d at 565.
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indigent so as to qualify for the services of the public defender.
3. Responsibility for Providing Counsel Upon the Parolee's
Transfer to a Different Correctional Facility.-DespitePassaro, in
certain situations, parolees still had difficulty obtaining satisfactory
legal representation in appealing Parole Board recommitment orders
either administratively to the Parole Board 82 or to the Commonwealth Court.8 3 The problem arose when the parolees were transferred by the Department of Corrections to a state correctional facility in a different county. Often, parolees would commence appeals of
parole recommitment orders while in a Diagnostic and Classification
Center and, subsequently, they would be transferred to a different
institution in a different county. The original public defender would
often seek to be relieved of the responsibility of prosecuting the appeal on the basis that his or her county was no longer the confining
county under Passaro.The public defender of the county to which
the parolee was transferred would then argue that the county of confinement is determined at the time the appeal is commenced under
Passaro.The end result of this jurisdictional dispute between county
public defenders was that parolees were often not provided with sufficient representation during the appellate process. In 1985, four
years after it handed down Passaro,the Commonwealth Court settled this dispute in Brewer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole.4 The court determined that the county of confinement for
Passaro purposes is the county in which the parolee is physically
located.
In Brewer, the parolee was located at the Eastern Diagnostic
and Classification Center at SCI-Graterford when he filed his appeal
of the Parole Board's recommitment order with Commonwealth
Court. Under the mandate of Passaro, the Montgomery County
public defender's office undertook representation of the parolee in
the Commonwealth Court. After the public defender entered his appearance on the parolee's behalf, the Department of Corrections
transferred the parolee to SCI-Rockview, in Centre County. The
Montgomery County public defender then petitioned the Common82. The Parole Board affords parolees who are dissatisfied with its recommitment orders an administrative appeal procedure through its Hearing Review Division. See 37 PA. AD-'
MIN. CODE § 71.5(h) (Shepard's 1985).
83. Jurisdiction over appeals from Parole Board recommitment orders is vested in the
Commonwealth Court by virtue of 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 763 (Purdon 1982). See also
Bronson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 457, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
84. 90 Pa. Commw. 75, 494 A.2d 36 (1985).
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wealth Court to vacate his appointment and appoint the Centre
County public defender to represent the parolee in prosecuting the
appeal. The Centre County public defender objected to this petition.
The Commonwealth Court, in an opinion by Judge John A. MacPhail, reasoned that the parolee could be most effectively represented
by the public defender situated in the host county and it required the
Centre County public defender to represent the parolee. 85 Under
present law, then, when the Department of Corrections transfers a
parolee from one institution to another, the responsibility for providing legal counsel shifts to the public defender in the new host county.
4. Waiving the Right to Counsel.-As with any statutory or
constitutional right, a parolee can expressly waive his or her right to
be represented by counsel at a parole revocation hearing. The Parole
Board has detailed regulations that ensure that a parolee is fully informed of the extent of his or her right to counsel, and, in the case of
an indigent parolee, the right to free counsel. The parolee is provided
with the name and address of the appropriate public defender to
whom the parolee may apply for representation, and the regulations
require that the Parole Board or its hearing examiners grant a parolee's request for a continuance for the purpose of obtaining counsel.86 This information is to be provided to the parolee both orally
and in writing. 87 If, after being advised of his or her right to counsel,
the parolee desires to waive that right, the Parole Board requires
that the parolee execute a form acknowledging that waiver. The
form is then placed in the record. 88
This procedure was challenged as ineffective in Coades v. Pennsylvania Board of Probationand Parole.8 There, the parolee, David
Coades, was charged with violating his parole by committing a criminal offense for which he was subsequently convicted. The conviction
itself was a matter of public record and was not disputed by
85.

Id. at 78-79, 494 A.2d at 38.

86.

37 PA.

ADMIN. CODE

§ 71.4(3),(5)(iv) (Shepard's 1980).

87. Id.
88. Id. § 71.4(5)(iv). The document which the parolee signs to document the waiver of
counsel is PBPP-72, which reads as follows:
Waiver of Representation By Counsel
Having been fully advised of my right to counsel of my choice to represent

me at a hearing before a Board Member or Members, or their representative,
and of my right to appointed counsel if I cannot afford counsel of my choice, I
hereby waive this right and request that my hearing be held without benefit of
counsel.
This waiver is made of my own free will, without threat or coercion.
89. 84 Pa. Commw. 484, 480 A.2d 1298 (1984).
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Coades. 90 At his full Board revocation hearing before three members
of the Parole Board, Coades stated that he desired to be represented
by the public defender of Delaware County, the county in which his
original conviction occurred, but that the Delaware County public
defender would not represent him at the parole revocation hearing
held at SCI-Graterford in Montgomery County. After a short onthe-record discussion with members of the Parole Board, Coades
agreed to waive representation rather than postpone his parole revocation hearing. He then executed a form waiving counsel, which was
placed in the record.
After the Parole Board ordered his parole revoked and recommitted him to prison to serve two years, Coades filed an appeal with
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. He argued that the procedures utilized by the Parole Board did not establish a knowing, informed and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Coades further
alleged that since his waiver was neither knowing, informed or voluntary, it was ineffective and he was entitled to a new hearing with
counsel present to represent him.
After reviewing the nature of a parolee's right to counsel at Parole Board revocation hearings, the Commonwealth Court rejected
Coades' argument that the Parole Board must substantially comply
with the requirements of Rule 318 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure91 in order for a parolee's waiver of counsel to be
effective as knowing, informed and voluntary. Rule 318 requires an
extensive on-the-record colloquy between the court and the defendant so as to ensure that the defendant:
(1) understands that he has the right to be represented by
counsel, and the right to have free counsel appointed if he is
indigent;
(2) understands the nature of the charges against him and
the elements of each of those charges;
(3) is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or
fines for the offenses charged;
(4) understands that if he waives the right to counsel he
will still be bound by all the normal rules of procedure and that
counsel would be familiar with these rules;
(5) understands that there are possible defenses to these
charges that counsel might be aware of, and if these defenses
90. Coades' subsequent conviction was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
1978, after his August 1977 full Board parole revocation hearing. See Commonwealth v.
Coades, 260 Pa. Super. 327, 394 A.2d 575 (1978).
91. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 318.
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are not raised at trial, they may be lost permanently; and
(6) understands that, in addition to defenses, the defendant
has many rights that, if not timely asserted, may be lost permanently; and if errors occur and are not timely objected to, or
otherwise timely raised by the defendant, any objection may be
lost permanently.92
The Commonwealth Court determined that, by their very nature, the
Rules of Criminal Procedure are not applicable, directly or indirectly, to the Parole Board's revocation proceedings. In contrast with
probation revocation hearings, which take place in common pleas
courts subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Parole
Board's revocation hearings are civil administrative hearings to
which principles of administrative law and administrative due process apply. 93 The court then reviewed the procedure utilized by the
Parole Board and determined that it adequately safeguarded the parolee's right to counsel under both federal and Pennsylvania law. 94
This procedure, as outlined by the Parole Board's regulations,
requires that parolees are:
(I) provided with written notice of the alleged parole
violations; 95
(2) notified, both orally and in writing, that the parolee has
the right to an attorney to assist in defending against the alleged
parole violations;"
(3) notified, both orally and in writing, that if the parolee
cannot afford retained counsel, the parolee is entitled to the services of the public defender without charge; 7
(4) provided with the name and address of the local public
defender to whom the parolee may apply for legal representation
if indigent; 8
(5) notified, both orally and in writing, that the parolee will
in no way be penalized for requesting counsel. 99
When, after receipt of all of the above information, the parolee
desires to waive representation by counsel, the Parole Board then
92. Id. see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Fairman v. Cavell, 423 Pa. 138, 222 A.2d 722
(1966); see also PA. R. CRIM. P. 318 comment.
93. Gundy v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa. Commw. 618, 622, 478
A.2d 139, 141 (1984).
94. Coades, 84 Pa. Commw. at 499-500, 480 A.2d at 1306.
95. 37 PA, ADMIN. CODE §§ 71.2(12)(i), 71.4(3)(i) (Shepard's 1983).
96. Id. §§ 71.2(12)(v), 71.4(3)(ii).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. §§ 71.2(15), 71.4(3)(iii).
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requires the parolee to execute a written waiver form which is then
placed in the record. 100 When a parolee appears at a Parole Board
hearing without counsel, and the parolee is unwilling to waive counsel, the regulations require the Parole Board, or its hearing examiner, to terminate the proceedings and promptly reschedule the hearing. 101 The Commonwealth

Court

found that

this procedure

adequately insured that parolees were informed of their right to
counsel and that counsel would be waived only after the parolee received that information. This procedure, according to the court, provided for an informed and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel
consistent with the nature of that right in Parole Board revocation
proceedings. 02
The Commonwealth Court subsequently reaffirmed its holding
in Coades in Hill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole01
04
and Oliver v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.1
In
Hill, the parolee, Charles Hill, expressly refused a Parole Board
hearing examiner's offer of a continuance to obtain the presence of
an attorney, choosing instead to waive counsel and proceed with the
hearing. During his on-the-record discussion with the hearing examiner, Hill stated that he only wanted to put his desire for counsel on
the record so that it might serve as a possible basis for a subsequent
appeal. On those facts, the Commonwealth Court found an informed
and deliberate waiver of the right to counsel and refused to provide
Hill with a second bite of the apple.105
The facts in Oliver differ slightly from those in Hill. In Oliver,
the parolee, John Oliver, was provided with court-appointed counsel
in his related criminal case. However, appointed counsel was only
charged with representing Oliver in the criminal case in common
pleas court and did not represent him in any matters before the Parole Board. Oliver told the Parole Board members at his September
1, 1983, parole revocation hearing that he had been interviewed and
would be represented by a member of the public defender's office.
However, no attorney from that office appeared on Oliver's behalf.
After being advised of his right to counsel and offered a continuance
to procure the presence of counsel, Oliver unequivocally stated that
he did not wish to continue his hearing and wanted to proceed with100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. § 71.2(15), 71.4(5)(iv).
Id. §71.4(5)(iv).
Coades, 84 Pa. Commw. at 499-500, 502-04, 480 A.2d at 1306, 1307-08.
89 Pa. Commw. 140, 492 A.2d 80 (1985).
89 Pa. Commw. 635, 494 A.2d 10 (1985).
Hill, 89 Pa. Commw. at 146, 492 A.2d at 83.
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out counsel. His only concern was that he would be able to crossexamine witnesses. On those facts, the Commonwealth Court found
a valid waiver of counsel and rejected Oliver's plea to the
contrary.' 0 1
Under the holdings of Coades, Hill and Oliver, a parolee's
waiver of his or her right to counsel will be deemed knowing, informed and voluntary, and will be given effect, as long as the Parole
Board follows the procedure outlined in its own regulations. As the
Commonwealth Court noted in Coades, the Parole Board has the
information regarding the right to counsel and the name and address
of the applicable public defender printed on its Notice of Hearing
and Charges form, which are given to parolees in advance of the
scheduled parole revocation hearings.107
E. Determining Counsel's Effectiveness
The right to representation by counsel that parolees enjoy also
requires that counsel provide effective assistance. 10 8 In LaCourt v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 09 the Commonwealth
Court set forth its standard for evaluating the performance of counsel to determine whether the parolee was in fact provided with effective assistance of counsel. That standard, derived from the United
10
States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington,"
consists of two elements. To establish that counsel's assistance was
ineffective so as to entitle the parolee to a new hearing with different
counsel, the parolee is required to establish that:
(1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as "counsel" guaranteed under law; and
(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."'
In order to be entitled to relief, a parolee must satisfy both parts of
the LaCourt test. A survey of reported cases emanating from Pennsylvania's Supreme and Commonwealth Courts have revealed only
one in which the parolee was successful in proving that counsel's per106. Oliver, 89 Pa. Commw. at 638-39, 494 A.2d at 12.
107. See Coades v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 84 Pa. Commw. 484, 497
n.16, 480 A.2d 1298, 1305 n.16 (1984).
108. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 271 Pa. Super. 138, 412 A.2d 614 (1979), appeal after
remand, 275 Pa. Super. 544, 419 A.2d 34 (1980).
109. 87 Pa. Commw. 384, 488 A.2d 70 (1985).
110. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (criminal prosecution).
III. 87 Pa. Commw. at 392, 488 A.2d at 75.
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formance was so deficient as to warrant a new parole revocation
hearing.
The sole reported case where a parolee successfully argued his
defense counsel was ineffective is Vereen v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole.1 12 In Vereen, the parolee, LeVance Vereen,
was charged with violating his parole by using illegal drugs, specifically cocaine. At his parole Violation Hearing, the major piece of
evidence his parole agent sought to use against him was a laboratory
urinalysis report consisting solely of a computer printout. The Parole
Board hearing examiner admitted the printout without objection by
Vereen's defense counsel. Based largely upon the laboratory report,
the Parole Board revoked Vereen's parole for his use of cocaine.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, Vereen,
now represented by different counsel, argued his hearing counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the laboratory
report as hearsay. The Commonwealth Court, in an opinion authored
by Senior Judge Alexander F. Barbieri, agreed. The Court reviewed
Vereen's claim of ineffective assistance on the basis of the two-tiered
LaCourt test. Judge Barbieri concluded Vereen met the first part of
the test when he determined Vereen's hearing counsel had no reasonable basis for omitting the hearsay objection, which was of arguable
merit, and that the omission was so serious that counsel was not
'
functioning as counsel "guaranteed by law." 11
Since the laboratory
report was the major piece of evidence against Vereen, Judge Barbieri concluded he met the second-tier of the LaCourt test since the
result of the parole Violation Hearing probably would have been different had Vereen's hearing counsel made the omitted hearsay objection, thus entitling him to a new Violation Hearing with different
counsel.

114

The contrary result seems to be the norm. In LaCourt, the

Commonwealth Court refused to hold that defense counsel's performance was ineffective due to the transfer of responsibility from
the Defender Association of Philadelphia to the Montgomery County
Public Defender's Office occasioned by the parolee's transfer from
Philadelphia County Prison to SCI-Graterford. The court found no
errors on the part of counsel nor any prejudice to LaCourt's
defense. 116
112.
- Pa. Commw. -,
515 A.2d 637 (1986).
113. Id. at.
,515 A.2d at 641.
114. Id. at __,515 A.2d at 641-42.
115. LaCourt, 87 Pa. Commw. at 392, 488 A.2d at 75.
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In Winters v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,""
the Commonwealth Court held that appellate counsel's failure to
provide his parolee client with a copy of his brief prior to its filing
with the court did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel
entitling the parolee to fire his appointed counsel and procure substitute counsel at public expense.1 7 A similar result was reached by the
same court in Toth v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole," 8 in which the parolee claimed that appellate counsel's brief
grossly misstated his position and rendered his appeal ineffective. Although Toth was decided prior to LaCourt, and was framed in the
context of appointed counsel's motion for leave to withdraw from the
case after the parolee made the allegations of ineffectiveness to the
court, the rationale of the opinion is consistent with LaCourt and
those cases that follow it.
While neither Toth nor Winters mentioned it, both decisions are
in accord with the rationale used by the United States Supreme
Court in Jones v. Barnes," in which the Supreme Court held that
defense counsel is not ineffective when he or she fails to raise every
nonfrivolous point requested by the defendant. In so holding, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger,
specifically stated that an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous
points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional
20
judgment, decides not to press those points.1
In O'Hara v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,''
the Commonwealth Court held that even counsel's failure to appear
at a parole revocation hearing did not constitute ineffective assistance. The court found that the parolee failed to take any steps to
ensure that his counsel was aware of and could be present at that
hearing. 2 2 Since the court did not believe that the outcome of the
116. Pa. Commw. -,
503 A.2d 488 (1986).
117. Id. at -,
503 A.2d at 493.
118. 78 Pa. Commw. 19, 466 A.2d 782 (1983). As he did in Winters, Commonwealth
Court Judge John A. MacPhail expressly found that the parolee's complaints against appointed counsel were unfounded. Id, at 21 n.2, 466 A.2d at 783 n.2.
119. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
120. Id. at 751.
121. 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985).
122. Id. at 369, 487 A.2d at 97. In O'Hara, there was also a question whether the

specific attorney whom the parolee desired and whom the parolee insisted still represent him
did in fact continue to represent the parolee. See id. at 369 n.15, 487 A.2d at 97 n.15. The
attorney in question, while not a public defender, appeared to be court-appointed pursuant to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 9960.7 (Purdon Supp. 1985) and not privately retained by O'Hara.
Normally, such court appointments are made by the common pleas court in the case of a
conflict with the county public defender and are for a specific criminal charge and do not
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hearing would have been different had O'Hara's counsel been pre-

sent, it found no actual prejudice to O'Hara.
F.

Remedies for a Violation of the Right to Counsel

When a violation of a parolee's right to counsel is established,
the Pennsylvania appellate courts provide the parolee with a de novo
parole revocation hearing at which he or she is provided with coun-

sel. 123 The courts have consistently held that the deprivation of the
right to counsel at any stage of the parole revocation process entitles
the parolee only to a new hearing, not to a dismissal of the parole
violation charges. This remedy is consistent with that provided to

probationers who are deprived of counsel at probation revocation
hearings and to defendants who have their right to counsel violated
in criminal prosecutions. 24
This remedy, however, often amounts to a Pyrrhic victory in
that the outcome of the second parole revocation hearing is almost
always the same as that of the initial hearing and the delay awaiting
the second hearing is usually greater than the backtime. The only

circumstances in which a de novo hearing with counsel is of any benefit to the parolee is when extensive mitigating circumstances exist
that may only be adequately and effectively developed with the aid
of counsel, or serious evidentiary problems in the case of technical
parole violations. However, when the parole violation charged is that

the parolee committed a new crime while on parole, and the parolee
is subsequently convicted, that conviction is a matter of public record. Thus, the Parole Board needs only to produce adequate documentation of that conviction to establish a parole violation since the
parolee cannot relitigate the fact of that conviction. Under the latter
automatically encompass representation of the defendant at any related parole revocation
hearings conducted by the Parole Board. In addition, O'Hara's case originated in Erie County
and he was later transferred, following his conviction and sentencing, to SCI-Pittsburgh, in
Allegheny County. Under Passaro, once O'Hara was transferred from Erie County to SCIPittsburgh, the obligation to provide him with counsel at Parole Board revocation hearings
rested with the Allegheny County Public Defender, not Erie County. In this particular case,
O'Hara's court-appointed attorney stood in the stead of the Erie County Public Defender,
which may explain his absence from the parole revocation hearings scheduled for SCI-Pittsburgh. The Commonwealth Court specifically noted that O'Hara refused to apply for a public
defender in Allegheny County. Id. at 369, 487 A.2d at 97.
123. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842
(1973); Sharp v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 78 Pa. Commw. 441, 467 A.2d
1194 (1983); Brown v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 70 Pa. Commw. 597, 453
A.2d 1068 (1982); Passaro v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 56 Pa. Commw. 32,
424 A.2d 561 (1981).
124. See generally United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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circumstances, the primary duty of counsel is to assist the parolee in
demonstrating to the Parole Board that, despite the new conviction,
parole remains a viable means of rehabilitation. 25
IV.

Limits on the Right to Counsel

In recent years, the Pennsylvania appellate courts, particularly
the Commonwealth Court, have been refining the parolee's right to
counsel by placing some outside limits on that right. One of the most
active areas of litigation in this context has been a parolee's ability
to discharge and replace appointed counsel with whom the parolee is
dissatisfied. Another area concerns the appointed counsel's ability to
withdraw from representing a parolee.
A. Substitute Counsel
In LaCourt, the Commonwealth Court held that, while an indigent parolee enjoys an absolute right to appointed counsel in parole
revocation proceedings, a parolee does not have a right to appointed
counsel of his or her choice. " In Winters, the Commonwealth Court
reaffirmed this view, holding that a parolee who is dissatisfied with
counsel's performance is not entitled to discharge counsel and obtain
substitute counsel at public expense when the Court determines
counsel's performance to be satisfactory. 12 7 Thus, it is the court, and
not the parolee, that decides when substitute counsel is appropriate.
In Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,'"
the Commonwealth Court likewise held that a parolee whose courtappointed counsel had determined that the parolee's case was wholly
frivolous and petitioned the court for leave to withdraw did not have
a right to have substitute counsel appointed. The court held that
once counsel had examined the record and found the case to be
wholly frivolous, and after the reviewing court agreed with counsel's
assessment as to the frivolity of the appeal, counsel had fully discharged her duty to the parolee. The parolee was not entitled to a
legal "second opinion" as to the merit, or lack thereof, of the appeal. 2 9 This position was subsequently reaffirmed by the Commonwealth Court in Hillanbrand v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
125.
vania Bd.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); Simmons v. Pennsylof Probation and Parole, 74 Pa. Commw. 283, 459 A.2d 897 (1983).
87 Pa. Commw. at 390, 488 A.2d at 74.
- Pa. Commw. at -,
503 A.2d at 493 (1986).
Pa. Commw. -,
506 A.2d 517 (1986).
Id. at -,
506 A.2d at 520.
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and Parole.3 0
B. Right of Counsel to Withdraw from Representation
While parolees have a right to have counsel assist them in resisting revocation of their paroles, there are circumstances in which
counsel will be granted leave to withdraw from further representing
a particular parolee. While this rarely occurs at the hearing stage of
the parole revocation process, it is becoming less rare during the appellate stage. In the reported cases that have addressed the subject,
two grounds have been advanced by counsel seeking court permission
to withdraw their appearance: (1) when counsel has determined that
the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (2) when the parolee's conduct
has rendered it unreasonably difficult or impossible for counsel to
carry out effectively the terms of employment. The foundations for
both of these grounds are found in the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1974.131
1. Frivolity.-The right of a parolee to counsel's assistance in
appealing a Parole Board revocation order does not give the parolee
the right to compel counsel to prosecute an appeal that counsel has
determined to be "wholly frivolous."''3 8 Pennsylvania appellate courts
have defined "wholly frivolous" to mean more than that the appeal
merely lacks merit. Rather, an appeal is "wholly frivolous" when
there is "a complete lack of points present that might arguably support an appeal." 3a
The reported cases give some insight into what an appellate
court considers sufficient frivolity to permit a parolee's counsel to
withdraw from further representation. In Craig v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole,8 4 the parolee, Clarence Craig, appealed a Parole Board revocation order solely on the basis that the
Parole Board failed to give him a revocation hearing within one hundred twenty days from the date of his conviction, as required by administrative regulation.18 5 However, a written waiver of that time
limit, signed by Craig while awaiting trial in Philadelphia County
130. Pa. Commw. -,
508 A.2d 375 (1986).
131. See PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(d), DR 7102(A)(2).
132. Craig v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 586, 502 A.2d
758 (1985). See generally Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 (1981); 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

133.
134.
135.

§ 4-3.9 comment (2d ed. 1980).

Commonwealth v. Greet, 455 Pa. 106, 108, 314 A.2d 513, 514 (1974).
93 Pa. Commw. 586, 502 A.2d 758 (1985).
See 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 71.4(2) (Shepard's 1980).
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Prison expressly requested that his revocation hearing, in the event
that he was convicted of the new charges, not be held until after his
post-trial motions were heard and he was sentenced on the new conviction.' At his parole hearing, Craig admitted signing the continuance request but argued that it was ineffective in that he did not
fully understand its implications. The public defender appointed to
represent Craig in his appeal to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court concluded that the contention and the appeal were wholly frivolous and sought leave to withdraw. The Commonwealth Court
agreed with the public defender's conclusion, granted leave to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. 31
Similarly, in Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole,13 8 the parolee, Daniel Santiago, filed an appeal of his parole
revocation order, alleging that the Parole Board erroneously recomputed the maximum term of his sentence. At the time of his recommitment as a convicted parole violator, he argued that he had only
one year, four months, eleven days remaining on his initial sentence,
whereas the Parole Board's recommitment order showed that he had
three years, seven months, and one day remaining on that sentence.
Upon examination of the record, it became evident to Santiago's appointed counsel that Santiago had confused the reduced maximum
term of his sentence, four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine
days, with his confinement credit time. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court agreed with counsel's determination that the appeal
was frivolous in that, since Santiago was resentenced on June 27,
1980, for a burglary which occurred in 1978, it was impossible for
him to have accumulated over four years confinement credit on that
sentence. 189

Finally, in Hillanbrandv. Pennsylvania Board of Probationand
Parole,"10 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the untimely filing of a petition for review deprived that court of jurisdiction and rendered the appeal wholly frivolous for purposes of permitting appellate counsel to withdraw his appearance. The Parole Board
denied Hillanbrand's administrative appeal on July 16, 1985. His
pro se petition for review was docketed with the Commonwealth
Court on August 30, 1985, outside the thirty-day appeal period pro136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

93 Pa. Commw. at 588 n.4, 502 A.2d at 759 n.4.
Id. at 593, 502 A.2d at 762.
Pa. Commw. -,
506 A.2d 517 (1986).
Id. at __
n.9, 506 A.2d at 519 n.9.
Pa. Commw. -,
508 A.2d 375 (1986).
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vided by the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.14 1 The public defender appointed to represent Hillanbrand in the appeal filed
an amended petition for review, and, thereafter, filed his request for
leave to withdraw based upon the untimely filing of the pro se petition. The public defender apparently found nothing in the record
that could be used as a basis to allege fraud or a breakdown in the
court's operations so as to justify a nunc pro tunc appeal." ' The
Commonwealth Court agreed with the public defender's conclusion
that the appeal was wholly frivolous due to the untimely filing of the
petition for review and commended the public defender for properly
discharging his duty to both his client and the court by seeking leave
143
to withdraw.
Craig, Santago, and Hillanbrand all hold that leave to withdraw will be readily granted when the frivolous nature of the appeal
is clear from the record. The language of those three cases also sets
forth the Commonwealth Court's opinion that a parolee's counsel not
only has the option to seek to withdraw from a frivolous appeal, but
is ethically required to do so." Thus, the parolee's right to representation does not apply to situations in which the appeal of a revocation order is wholly frivolous.
2. Unreasonable Conduct on the Part of the Parolee.-The
other ground on which counsel has sought leave to withdraw in parole cases is Disciplinary Rule 2-110(C)(1)(d) of the Pennsylvania
Code of Professional Responsibility.1 45 This rule allows counsel to
seek to withdraw when the client's conduct renders it unreasonably
difficult or impossible for counsel to carry out the terms of employment effectively. This issue is most likely to arise when there are
disputes between counsel and the parolee over appellate strategy and
141. See PA. R. APP. P. 1512(a)(1).
142. But cf. Moore v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, Pa. Commw.
, 503 A.2d 1099 (1986) (Parole Board's negligence in mailing parole revocation order to
wrong address resulted in parolee failing to receive proper notice of the order which amounted
to a breakdown in operations justifying the allowance of an administrative appeal nunc pro
tunc).
143. Hillanbrand, Pa. Commw. at -,
508 A.2d at 378-379. The Commonwealth Court also reaffirmed its prior holding in Albright v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 71
Pa. Commw. 114, 454 A.2d 1149 (1983) (per curiam), in which it approved of a denial of
legal services by the Community Legal Services (CLS) program to a client whose appeal was
frivolous, in part, due to the client's failure to file a timely appeal. In that opinion, the Commonwealth Court held that a lawyer does not only have the right to withdraw from a frivolous
case, but under PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4, is mandated to do so.
144. Hillanbrand,Pa. Commw. , 508 A.2d at 378-379; Santiago, Pa.
Commw. at -, 506 A.2d at 520; Craig, 93 Pa. Commw. at 593, 502 A.2d at 761.
145. See PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-10(C)(1)(d).

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

priorities.
In the only reported parole case dealing with this issue, Toth v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole," 6 counsel was denied

leave to withdraw on the basis of DR 2-1 1O(C)(1)(d). There, the
parolee, John Toth, strongly disagreed with the contents of the brief
that his public defender had filed in the appeal of a parole revocation

order pending in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. Toth complained in writing of counsel's alleged ineffectiveness to the Commonwealth Court's administrative staff and expressed a lack of confidence in his counsel. Counsel then filed a petition to withdraw based
upon Toth's complaints. The Commonwealth Court, however, found
that Toth's lack of confidence in his counsel, and his repeated pro se

communications with the court, did not amount to circumstances
that made it unreasonably difficult for counsel to carry out his duties
effectively and noted that counsel had done all that was required of
47

him.1
While the Court refused counsel leave to withdraw in Toth, it
did leave that avenue open for possible future petitions in appropriate cases. Such differences in opinion as to proper appellate strategy

and priorities are likely to continue to arise when the parolee's ideas
as to which points and facts are important clash with the professional judgment of counsel. 14 At what point the differences of opinion will constitute sufficient grounds for counsel to withdraw under
DR 2-110(C)(1)(d) remains an open question.
3. Conflict of Interest.--One possible ground under which
counsel may seek to withdraw from representing a parolee is a conflict of interest. While there are no reported cases, the Pennsylvania

Commonwealth Court has recognized that conflicts of interest pose a
potential problem in providing counsel for parolees. " 9 The most
likely scenario in which a conflict of interest could arise is when a
146. 78 Pa. Commw. 19, 466 A.2d 782 (1983).
147. Id. at 21, 466 A.2d at 783.
148. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 465 (1983) (defendant does not have a constitutional
right to compel appellate counsel to raise all nonfrivolous points requested by the defendant);
Winters v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, Pa. Commw. -,
503 A.2d 488
(1986) (appellate counsel is not required to furnish a copy of the appellate brief to the parolee
prior to filing with the Commonwealth Court).
149. In its decision in Passaro v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 56 Pa.
Commw. 32, 424 A.2d 561 (1981), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court specifically held
that when a conflict of interest existed between an indigent parolee and the situs public defender's office, the public defender of an adjoining county would have the responsibility of
providing counsel to the parolee in the revocation proceedings before the Parole Board. Id. at
42, 424 A.2d at 565. See also Dobson v. Jacobs, 46 Pa. Commw. 548, 406 A.2d 1207 (1979).
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parolee is being represented by the same public defender's office or
law firm in both his parole revocation matter and the related crimi-

nal trial. Were the parolee to file a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA)150 alleging ineffective assistance of coun-

sel as one of the grounds for relief, a conflict of interest would exist
between the public defender and the parolee in all related matters. 1 '
In such a case, under Passaro,the parolee would be entitled to apply

to the public defender of an adjoining county for representation in
the parole revocation matter before the Parole Board.' 52
4. ProceduralSafeguards for the Parolee.-When a parolee
is faced with a situation in which counsel representing him or her
desires to withdraw, the parolee is afforded certain safeguards by the
courts that are designed to ensure withdrawal only after a careful
review of all pertinent facts by the applicable court. The parolee is

entitled to advance notice of counsel's desire to withdraw. In addition, he or she is given an opportunity to respond and to procure

substitute counsel, if possible.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has set forth the proce-

dural requirements with which counsel must comply in order to be
granted leave to withdraw from further representation.' 8 Those requirements were outlined by Commonwealth Court Senior Judge Alexander F. Barbieri in Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9551 (Purdon 1982).
151. See generally PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D); see also
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 278 Pa. Super. 35, 419 A.2d 1342 (1980) (conflict of interest exists
where the trial court appoints the public defender to represent a defendant in a PCHA petition
when the defendant has alleged ineffective assistance of another member of the same public
defender's office as one of the grounds for relief); Commonwealth v. Felder, 246 Pa. Super.
324, 370 A.2d 1214 (1976) (trial court erred in appointing the public defender to represent the
defendant in a PCHA petition when the defendant claimed that another member of the same
public defender's office was ineffective and counsel was required to choose between protecting
either the interests of his associates or the interests of his client); but see Comment, The
Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980) (discusses
law firms' use of strict compartmentalization and control of confidential information to prevent
entire firm from becoming tainted when one member has a conflict of interest). Pennsylvania
appellate courts have considered public defender's offices to constitute "law firms" for this
purpose. See Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 258 Pa. Super. 183, 392 A.2d 745 (1978).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.7 (Purdon Supp. 1985) provides that the applicable
common pleas court will appoint counsel to indigent defendants when a conflict exists with the
applicable public defender's office. The Commonwealth Court in both Passaro and Dobson
chose not to use this section of the Public Defender Act when it placed the responsibility in
cases coming before the Parole Board on adjoining public defender's offices in the event of a
conflict with the situs public defender's office.
153. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(l) provides that a lawyer may not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before a tribunal without the permission of that tribunal.
150.
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and Parole.15" Judge Barbieri wrote that counsel seeking to withdraw from representing a parolee must first meet certain specific requirements before the court would consider the motion to withdraw.
To satisfy these threshold requirements counsel must:
(1) notify the parolee of counsel's request to withdraw;
(2) furnish the parolee with a copy of the Anders brief' 55 or
advocate's brief filed by counsel;
(3) advise the parolee of his or her right to retain new counsel or raise any points which the parolee deems worthy of merit
in a pro se brief; and
(4) notify the parolee that he or she has thirty days from
the date of service of counsel's petition to withdraw and accompanying brief in which to answer or otherwise respond to counsel's motion to withdraw.156
When counsel seeks to withdraw on the ground that the parolee's matter is frivolous, prior to seeking leave to withdraw, counsel
is required to undertake an exhaustive examination of the record to
ensure that the matter is in fact wholly frivolous. 157 After counsel
has made that examination and filed the motion, complying with the
requirements set forth in Santiago, the reviewing court then has an
obligation to make an independent examination of the record in order to ensure that counsel's conclusion as to the frivolous nature of
the matter was indeed correct. 158 Only when the reviewing court, after an independent examination of the record, agrees with counsel's
conclusion as to the frivolous nature of the case will counsel be
granted leave to withdraw.1

59

154: Pa. Commw. , 506 A.2d 517 (1986).
155. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (if appointed counsel finds a case to
be wholly frivolous after conscientious examination, he or she should so advise the court and
request to withdraw, but the request must be accompanied by a brief pointing at anything in
the record that might arguably support the appeal).
156. Pa. Commw. , 506 A.2d at 519. These requirements are consistent with
the requirements found in PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2),
which states that a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until the lawyer has taken
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, and delivering to the client
all papers and property to which the client is entitled. The first three requirements were specifically adopted from the procedure utilized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981), for entertaining motions by counsel
to withdraw from criminal cases on the grounds of frivolity.
157. Craig v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 586, 502 A.2d
758 (1985).
158. Id. at -, 502 A.2d at 761; see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; McClendon, 495
Pa. at 471, 434 A.2d at 1187.
159. Craig, 93 Pa. Commw. at 593, 502 A.2d at 762.
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Areas Where the Right to Counsel Does Not Apply

The right of a parolee to the services of a lawyer, and to an
appointed lawyer if indigent, does not extend to every area of contact
between the parolee and the Parole Board. Rather, the right to coun-

sel, as defined by Pennsylvania law, is limited only to those areas in
which the parolee is in danger of having an existing parole revoked.

That is, the right applies only when an existing liberty interest would
be affected.
It is clear that, prior to becoming a parolee, a prisoner does not
have a right to have a lawyer assist in the preparation of a parole
application or in the presentation of that application to the Parole

Board. 160 Neither does a prisoner have a right to the assistance of
counsel in appealing a denial of a parole application."' Likewise, a
prisoner whose parole is revoked by the Parole Board has no right to
the assistance of counsel in applying for a grant of reparole. The
Parole Board's revocation order effectively strips the prisoner of the
status of a parolee thereby causing the prisoner to lose the constitutionally recognized and protected liberty interest in parole, along
with the attendant right to counsel under Pennsylvania law. 6 2
Moreover, a grant of parole does not automatically vest any
rights in the prisoner until that parole is actually executed by the
prisoner's release from prison. 6 s Until that grant of parole is executed, the Parole Board may rescind its order granting parole without a due process hearing or the prisoner being represented by a
lawyer. 164 Thus, until the prisoner attains the status of "parolee" by
160. Counts v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 277, 487
A.2d 450 (1985).
161. Id. at 278 n.1, 487 A.2d at 451 n.l. The Commonwealth Court has held, however,
that a Parole Board order denying a parole application is not subject to judicial review. Reider
Pa. Commw. , 514 A.2d 967 (1986)
v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, (en banc); LaCamera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 13 Pa. Commw. 85, 317
A.2d 925 (1974) (en banc). There is case law that indicates such an order may be challenged
for constitutional violations. See Bachman v. Jeffes, 488 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Pa. 1980). As a
general rule, the judiciary will not interfere with the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion in
weighing the actual merits of a particular parole application or judging the suitability of any
particular prisoner for parole since such matters are the proper subject of administrative, not
judicial, disrection. Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248,
501 A.2d 1110 (1985); Bradshaw v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 75 Pa.
Commw. 90, 461 A.2d 342 (1983).
162. Counts, 87 Pa. Commw. at 283, 487 A.2d at 453; see also Krantz v. Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 38, 483 A.2d 1044 (1984) (Parole Board's setting of a tentative reparole date in its revocation order vests no right to a grant of reparole in
the prisoner whose parole is revoked by that revocation order).
163. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981); Jones v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation
and Parole, 81 Pa. Commw. 194, 473 A.2d 247 (1984).
164. Green v. Pennsylvania Rd. of Probation and Parole, No. 563 Slip op. (C.D. Pa.
Commw. Oct. 1, 1986); Franklin v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa. Commw.
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virtue of actually being released from prison, the prisoner has no
protected or recognized interest in the grant of parole and is entitled
to none of the procedural due process safeguards, including the right
to the assistance of a lawyer to resist the action of the Parole
Board. 165
Finally, the right to counsel does not attach to every dispute

that a parolee might have with the Parole Board. Parolees who challenge the Parole Board's computation of the expiration date of their
maximum sentences in their parole release orders are not entitled to
the assistance of counsel in prosecuting such challenges.166 Likewise,
parolees who bring civil actions against the Parole Board, whether in
mandamus or otherwise, are not entitled to the assistance of counsel
in prosecuting those claims. 16 7 Since the parolees in either of those
situations are not in danger of having their paroles revoked by the
specific action, there is no right to counsel connected with those actions. While the parolees might privately retain counsel, indigent pa-

rolees do not qualify for appointment of counsel.166
318, 476 A.2d 1026 (1984).
165. Franklin, 83 Pa. Commw. at 321, 476 A.2d at 1027; Jones, 81 Pa. Commw. at
199, 473 A.2d at 249.
166. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 90 Pa. Commw.
318, 495 A.2d 623 (1985).
167. See e.g., St. Clair v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa. Commw.
561, 493 A.2d 146 (1985) (appointment of counsel vacated when parolee is granted leave to
proceed with mandamus action under original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court).
168. While the prisoners in LaCamera, Franklin, Counts and Barnhouse were represented in their appeals of Parole Board orders denying their parole applications or rescinding
previously approved parole applications, they can be reconciled with the Commonwealth
Court's holding in Counts that prisoners in such appeals are not entitled to appointment of
counsel. In Barnhouse, the prisoner had retained private counsel to assist him in challenging
the Parole Board's denial of his parole application. While they are not entitled to appointed
counsel at public expense for such appeals, prisoners are able to hire their own attorneys if
they have the means to do so. The prisoner in Franklin was represented by the Montgomery
County Public Defender who undertook his representation gratuitously and not as a result of
any court-appointment. While the prisoner in Counts was represented by appointed counsel,
the Commonwealth Court recognized its error in the opinion and held that henceforth prisoners who appeal from parole Board orders that deny parole applications will not be provided
with appointed counsel. 87 Pa. Commw. at 278 n.l, 487 A.2d at 451 n.l. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to review the Commonwealth Court's holding in that case, it now
seems to be settled law. Counts v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, No. 236 E.D.
Allocatur Docket 1985 (Pa. filed Sept. 5, 1985). The Commonwealth Court's appointment of
counsel in LaCamera can be explained in light of its action in Counts.
The Commonwealth Court's decision in Reider v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, Pa. Commw. -,
514 A.2d 967 (1986) (en banc), that precludes judicial review
of Parole Board orders denying parole may have mooted this issue. However, the lack of any
pronouncement from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as to the appealability of such orders
leaves some doubt as to the finality of Reider in light of possible challenges on procedural or
constitutional grounds.
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V. Conclusion
While the right to the assistance of counsel to aid a parolee in
resisting the revocation of parole by the Parole Board is an absolute
right under Pennsylvania law, that right is tightly restricted to apply
only to those actions that may actually revoke an existing parole.
When the parolee's constitutionally recognized interest in the limited
freedom offered by parole is not endangered, as in the case when the
parolee disputes the Parole Board's calculation of the expiration date
of the parolee's maximum sentence in its grant of parole, no right to
counsel attaches to the parolee's challenge of the Board's action.
Even so, the right to counsel that parolees enjoy under Pennsylvania
law, although based in statutory law, is greater than that afforded
them under the federal or Pennsylvania Constitution. That right has
been consistently recognized by Pennsylvania's General Assembly
and by its appellate courts as absolute and as an important factor in
the administration of Pennsylvania's criminal justice system.

